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Article 
Facehunting 
Empathy, Masculinity and Violence Among the Bugkalot 
Henrik Hvenegaard Mikkelsen 

University of Copenhagen 
Abstract This article discusses how anthropological explorations of  empathy can be enriched 
through a focus on transgression. Empathy is commonly understood as a human capacity that 
allows a person to share the feelings of  others through some form of  mental engagement. 
Thereby, it is believed, empathy establishes compassionate relationships between people and 
prevents violence from breaking out. In this article, I suggest the opposite may be the case: in 
fact, empathy may be the very foundation for acts of  radical violence and killings. The 
ethnographic basis of  my inquiry is research conducted among the Bugkalot (Ilongot) of  
northern Philippines on the practice of  headhunting. I propose that empathy is what allows 
violence to achieve its transformative capacity. Furthermore, I seek to show how understanding 
headhunting as ‘murder’ may disclose how this particular act is tied to masculine ideals of  
autonomy. Headhunting, I argue, targets not the head but the ‘face,’ that is, it strikes at the very 
fulcrum of  the ethical relation and the foundation of  empathy.  
Keywords Bugkalot, Ilongot, headhunting, empathy, transgression, violence 
This infinity, stronger than murder,  
already resists me in her face, is her face,  
is the primordial expression, is the first word:  
‘you shall not commit murder.’  
Levinas, Totality and Infinity 
‘It is not easy! It is a hard task!’ … In 2010, I was having a discussion with Tó’paw, a 60-
year-old Bugkalot man, about the practice ritual headhunting, ngayó, which involved 
cutting off  the head of  the victim. He was irritated that this form of  killing, which was 
largely abandoned as a common practice in the Sierra Madre Mountains of  northern 
Philippines in the 1970s, was today talked about among the youth as if  it was merely 
some type a ‘game.’ It seemed vital to him that I understood that ngayó had deep and at 
times devastating effects on the dima mamotog— ‘the ones who cut.’ ‘I once had the 
experience that I could not hold on to my bolo,’ he continued. ‘I had to hold it with 
both of  my hands. This was not just because of  fear. To kill a human this way is hard. 
It’s a big thing for the young man who succeeds in this endeavour. It is supposed to be 
demanding.’ 
In this article, I examine a form of  masculinity that manifests itself  through 
transgression. In this sense, not only is it ‘demanding’ to kill another person—it is, 
within the context of  headhunting, supposed to be demanding. Ngayó refers to the type of 
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headhunting that made the Bugkalot  rise to scholarly fame through the works of  1
Michelle Rosaldo (1980, 1983, 1984) and Renato Rosaldo (1980, 2004). It is a collective 
event that circles around the intentional beheading of  a human person. And the 
treatment of  the victim’s body during ngayó seems surprisingly brutal: after the victim 
had been ambushed and shot, his or her head was cut off  at the neck, preferably in one 
determined strike with the headhunting knife, the tek-yaden, and was subsequently tossed 
to the ground with all the force that the killer could muster in a final deed known as 
balabag. This treatment of  the head (or rather, the face) was part of  a transformative act 
that ultimately aimed to render the man autonomous as he was no longer dominated by 
chaotic emotions of  shame, and anger. 
This situation requires us to reconsider key questions concerning the role of  empathy in 
relation to violence, especially in the way empathy tends to be considered as being 
antithetical to violence. Empathy, in this conventional view, is based on the pre-reflexive 
experience of  the affective and experiential world of  others as analogous to our own. 
This phenomenological engagement in the world is implicit in our recognition of  others 
as members of  our moral community. Empathy, then, involves a moral commitment to 
others, a certain proximity, which commands us not to kill. This idea is present in Zygmund 
Bauman’s book, Modernity and the Holocaust, in which he reveals a Levinasian inspiration 
in his thinking. He argues that our sense of  responsibility for other people is dependent 
upon proximity. Thus, morality ‘looms large and thick close to the eye. With the growth 
of  distance, responsibility for the other shrivels, moral dimensions of  the object blur, till 
both reach the vanishing point and disappear from view’ (Bauman 1989, 192). Writing 
about the famous experiment conducted by the psychologist Stanley Milgram at Yale 
University, Bauman argues that ‘it is difficult to harm a person we touch. It is somewhat 
easier to afflict pain upon a person we only see at a distance’ (Bauman 1989, 155). 
Rather than holding that Bauman is incorrect, I will argue that a form of  violence exists 
that is nourished by exertion. This type of  violence is transgressive through and through 
and would and in fact does only exist due to being difficult to carry out.  
This article contributes to current attempts to expand the category of  empathy and to 
explore the ways in which empathy may be culturally patterned (Throop 2010, 771). 
The task would be, as Nils Bubandt and Rane Willerslev recently phrased it, to move 
beyond ‘the implicit idea that empathy is always a moral virtue and instead embrace a 
broader approach that also encompass its darker, but no less social side’ (Bubandt and 
Willerslev 2015, 6). They argue that empathetic engagement with others may, in certain 
situations, not have intersubjective compassion and mutual understanding as its goal, 
and likewise the end-result may not always be a stronger social cohesion. In fact, the 
opposite may be the case. Empathy can be used for deceptive and ultimately violent 
purposes: the capacity for imagining the vantage point and emotional life of  another 
person may also provide a way to manipulate, abuse, and dehumanize that person.  
 For reasons that go beyond the scope of this article, the Bugkalot gradually changed their name during the 1
1970s. They began to be known as the E’gongot, meaning ‘from the forest/mountain,’ by the lowlanders and 
subsequently became widely known as the Ilongot within the anthropological literature through the ethnographic 
works of Renato Rosaldo (e.g., 1980, 2004) and Michelle Rosaldo (e.g., 1980, 1983). In accordance with the 
wishes of my informants, I will refer to them by the term Bugkalot. 
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Following this attempt to uncover the ‘dark side of  empathy’ this article seeks to show 
that rather than being antithetical to violence, empathy may, in some situations, be 
intrinsically linked to violence—not merely as that which makes violent acts possible, as 
Bubandt and Willerslev suggest, but as that which spurs and gives meaning to violence. 
This is the argument I pursue. However, I will argue that there may be a link between 
empathy and violence even when an empathetic relationship based on compassion 
persists between assailant and victim. Thereby empathy becomes the violent agent itself  
rather than a means to a violent outcome.   
The Dark Side of Empathy  
Across a wide range of scholarly fields, empathy is seen as centrally important in relation 
to our capacity to respond to others ethically (Copland and Goldie 2014). While such 
ideas have a long history, they have found their contemporary champions in influential 
scholars such as the professor of  developmental psychopathology, Simon Baron-Cohen. 
Believing that empathy is an ability as old as homo sapiens itself, he considers it ‘the 
“glue” of  the social world, drawing us to help others and stopping us from hurting 
others’ (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004, 163). According to Baron-Cohen (2004) 
we respond to cruelty in three ways: (1) we may ‘experience’ the suffering, (2) we may 
respond in ways that are considered culturally appropriate without experiencing the 
suffering, or (3) we may take pleasure in the suffering. Baron-Cohen argues that the first 
two should be considered empathetic responses while he explicitly categorizes the third 
response as unrelated to the empathetic faculties of  humans (see also Young 2012, 415). 
As reflected by the title of  his most recent book, The Science of  Evil (2011), Baron-Cohen’s 
work demonstrates the shifting of  the study of  ‘evil’ from the fields of  philosophy and 
theology into the field of  neuroscience. Evil becomes a naturalistic quality or a 
disposition, which involves a lack of  empathy, while empathy is regarded as the 
foundation for human moral behaviour.   2
Empathy, understood as a particular process in which one person imagines the 
particular perspective of  another person, is said to presuppose a conception of  the other 
as a distinct individual. In other words, by generating a ‘fundamentally individualizing 
view of  another’ (Halpern and Weinstein 2004, 567) empathy is understood to 
counteract objectifying and generalizing practices, which might in turn legitimate 
violence. This fundamental empathic conception of  the other as a human like myself, it 
is often argued, has as its critical consequence that ethnic cleansing and other mass scale 
violence require processes of  dehumanization in order to render such violence feasible; 
the victims must first be classified as less-than-human (Hinton 2002).  
Yet, within the last decade, anthropologists in particular have challenged such 
longstanding assumptions concerning empathy. They have commented on what they 
perceive to be a fundamental misapprehension in the way philosophers, social scientists, 
and, more recently, neuroscientists, have linked empathy to fundamental altruistic, social 
drives among humans. Nils Bubandt (2009) argues that empathy may just as well involve 
imagining the other as fundamentally inhuman thus legitimizing violence against 
 The conclusion on this issue within the neurosciences, however, is not unanimous. For instance, a recent study 2
shows that empathy for others can motivate violence on their behalf. For instance, the father who beats the man 
who has assaulted his child (Buﬀone and Poulin 2014).   
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political opponents. The aspiration of  this form of  ‘hostile empathy’ (ibid., 566) is not to 
obtain an ‘understanding nor compassionate knowledge of  the mind of  the other. 
Instead it has the aim of  laying … the imagined hostile intentions of  another in a 
political world where the mind of  the other is not open to scrutiny’ (ibid.). As Bubandt 
explains, hostile empathy permits ‘an imaginary leap into the mind and emotions of  the 
other that serves to reveal his inhumanity’ (ibid., 567). Likewise, in a recent article with 
Rane Willerslev, Nils Bubandt (2015) provides the argument that the link between 
empathy and deception has been given scant attention in the burgeoning literature on 
empathy. What they call for is a move beyond the idea of  empathy as an altogether 
altruistic capacity or as synonymous with ‘sympathy.’ They visit ethnographic cases 
where people identify with the bodily states and experiences of  significant others and 
yet, ultimately, apply their empathetic understanding to hurt, cheat, and even kill the 
other. Thus, while compassion, mutual understanding, care, and social cohesion are the 
goals that have conventionally been regarded as the sine qua non of  empathy, Willerslev 
and Bubandt deliver the simple, yet overlooked, argument that the empathetic faculty 
may also be used for deceptive, dehumanizing, and violent purposes.  
While this argument goes a long way towards widening our understanding of  empathy it 
recapitulates the idea that empathy is in fact antithetical to violence—only in this 
approach empathy is applied to dehumanize the victim before the violence can be 
legitimatized and carried out. They thereby reinforce the assumption found in much 
writing, both popular and academic, that a process of  dehumanization precedes 
violence. For instance, it has been observed that within military training, enemies are 
persistently referred to as ‘rats,’ ‘dogs,’ and other terms by which they are portrayed as 
‘inferior forms of  life’ (Grossman 1995, 161) and set apart from the moral community 
(Blok 2000, 29). This, one could argue, creates a suspension of  ethical responsibility.  
This approach, which seeks to grasp and understand violence through the moral 
framework of  dehumanization, still leaves a critical set of  questions unresolved—in 
particular, in relation to the way that violence may gain a particular impact on the 
violator through the act of  willfully rupturing the empathetic relation. Such forms of  violence 
do not involve a suspension of  empathy, but maintain the empathetic bond in order to 
rupture it. This is the case with ngayó. 
The Bugkalot: Violence and Male Personhood 
The Bugkalot communities are nestled in the Caraballo and Sierra Mountain Range of  
northern Luzon. Although the approximately 46 villages are set apart by the expanse of  
these two mountain ranges, linguistic similarities are found throughout the area. Until 
recently, various areas of  the mountains were associated with different clans, and 
warfare could persist for decades. However, with the escalation of  agriculture and 
establishing of  roads, as the two major, interlinked agents of  change in the area, the 
contact between the clans has increased to the extent that the clan-label has today 
become almost insignificant in daily life. The institutions around which everyday life 
revolves are the household and conjugal family, and the networks of  kinship and affinity 
that link these units together in exchanges of  food, wealth, and labour.  
 8
The small village where I conducted ethnographic fieldwork had achieved barangay status 
in 1982. This meant that it had become recognized by the state as an administrative 
division or a district within the Philippines. With the institution of  the barangay, the 
position of  punong barangay—the official head of  the district—was also introduced. This 
position is up for election every three years. Whereas anthropologists have often noted 
that the state and its administrative techniques are widely regarded as alien impositions 
among rural communities around the world, this was not the case within a Bugkalot 
context in any straightforward way. They openly invited the political forms of  the state 
into village life. But when viewed through local ideas of  authority, such forms were little 
more than performances. The men I came to know who held or had previously held the 
position of  punong barangay admitted that this position had entailed only a minimum of  
real influence. Even after the introduction of  the barangay structure, the de facto largest 
political unit was the individual household, referred to as ten tengeng, one trunk. The 
punong barangay explained that while no hostility was directed against them, any attempt 
to make any changes in the village was simply ignored.  
However, the egalitarianism among the Bugkalot manifests itself  not only as 
disregarding of  political authority. Daily interaction was, in fact, saturated by egalitarian 
decorum. For instance, bragging (manga’ngadá’ngadáng,) was considered an extreme 
breach of  politeness that caused ‘bad atmosphere’ (ngégetáget) and ‘bad feelings’ (en-oget ma 
nem-nem). Such effects are considered adverse since they brought about feelings of  
jealousy among peers (apet).  
While the Bugkalot identify themselves patrilineally by descent through the male line, 
they have traditionally practiced a matrilocal form of  post-marital residence:  the man 
was expected to move in with his in-laws until he had paid the bridewealth (lango). This 
often entailed that the man moved to a community where he had a limited social 
network. My younger informants wanted to avoid the traditional conjugal procedures 
that they saw as outmoded and frustrating. For instance, prior to the wedding it was 
expected that the future husband would work for the girl’s family, a practice known as 
tognod, which could sometimes last for several years. This period was described to me as a 
time of  profound loneliness and insecurity. Often, the young man was requested to carry 
out arduous tasks in the fields, to bring back hunting rifles, generators, and various 
expensive tools from the lowlands that he had no chance of  procuring. When failing to 
do so he became the target of  agonizing insults from his peers.  
Due to the emotional torment of  the young men, they were often spoken of  as 
vulnerable, unpredictable, and prone to emotional outbursts. This condition was 
referred to as ligét—a term that refers to a form of  rage that may erupt in unforeseeable 
ways. But it was not only young men who could be marked by ligét. When faced with 
bereavement, such as the loss of  a close relative, more mature men could also be 
overcome by ligét. As the ligét of  men could erupt in ways that could attract legal action, 
it involved an inherent threat to the tranquility in the villages. I was often told that some 
men would try to overcome ligét through assertive action. Such action was referred to as 
pámotok, ‘cutting.’  
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Ngayó 
Originating within the context of  headhunting, pámotok refers to the cut—the severing of  
the head from the body—while the overall framework of  the customary practice—the 
departure, the long journey through the forest and the kill—is known as the ngayó. Yet, in 
most accounts the former headhunters do not refer to the head as such. Rather than 
targeting the head, ngayó targets the ‘face’ (ga-nop). Among the Bugkalot, as elsewhere, 
the face is related to the social aspects of  one’s personhood as the locus of  empathy, 
ethical relations, and the signalling of  emotional states. Thus, the cut that was carried 
out during ngayó entailed setting oneself  apart from the ordinary forms of  social 
interaction, which were marked by humble restraint (Author 2013). In other words, the 
purpose of  ngayó was not first and foremost a matter of  prestige or creating a difference 
in status between momotok (‘cutters’) and non-momotok. In fact, it was not possible to detect 
who had been engaged in ngayó from the way they were treated in general or from the 
amount of  respect they received. This observation is supported by the Philippinist and 
historian William Henry Scott (1979). He wrote that headhunting among the Bugkalot 
did not have any significant influence on the social status of  the killer, who was neither 
awarded with special privileges, nor subsequently classified as belonging to a warrior 
elite. To understand the Bugkalot impetus towards engaging in headhunting we must 
look beyond matters of  social prestige. 
More than half  of  my elderly, male informants claimed to have participated actively in 
these killings and almost all people who had been born into a Bugkalot community 
before the 1970s had first-person accounts of  ngayó—as killer, as eyewitness, or as 
survivor. Though headhunting was in decline alongside the emerging evangelization in 
the 1960s, it continued, though on a much lesser scale, even after the socio-economic 
incorporation of  the Bugkalot people into the economy of  the Philippine state (Yang 
2011). A friend and primary informant of  mine, Tó’paw, whose accounts inform much 
of  the following, carried out ngayó as late as 1993. And during my last visit in the field in 
January 2011, in the last stage of  my fieldwork, two beheaded men were found in the 
mountain interior (see Mikkelsen forthcoming).  
Attempting to explain what prompted their male informants to engage in ritual killing, 
the Rosaldos focused on the desire of  Bugkalot men to be like those among their peers 
who had previously taken a head. Envy (avet) was thereby conceptualized as a social 
engine that continually created ‘sameness’ among peers (M. Rosaldo 1980, 140). Thus, a 
striking feature of  headhunting was that it was carried out without at any point invoking 
any spirits, gods, or ancestors. Rather, the Rosaldos claimed, the Bugkalot referred to 
their individual desire, that is, a craving for accomplishing the same as their peers had, 
whereby they could cast off  the feelings of  despair and shame that caused anger and 
unrest. Michelle Rosaldo noticed that certain inherent aspects of  male personhood were 
tied up with the beheading and she noticed that local conceptualizations of  ngayó often 
revolved around ideas of  emotional states: the heaviness of  the heart (g’nawa) and anger 
(ligét) (see M. Rosaldo 1980, 1983). She argued that ligét increased when the egalitarian 
ideals of  “sameness” are breached. Ngayó, she argues, is the instrument that transforms 
‘the “shameful” weight of  childhood into the ease and the respectful “shame” 
appropriate to adults’ (1983, 146). Several of  the intriguing ideas presented by the 
Rosaldos need, however, to be critically addressed. For instance, as Peter Metcalf  
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pointed out, the act itself  seems almost completely arbitrary since the Rosaldos do not 
explain which attributes inherent to the specific act of  the ritual beheading have made it 
the violence of  choice among the Bugkalot (Metcalf  1996, 274).  
I suggest that the ngayó is in fact far from arbitrary. However, to grasp the significance of  
the specific act of  the ‘cut’ requires us to move beyond the depiction of  ngayó as a 
uniformly accepted, pristine, traditional practice, as it is depicted in the writings of  the 
Rosaldos. In fact, in the following, we will see what might be gained from seeing ngayó as 
an act of  transgression—or even an act of  murder—rather than an unambiguously 
endorsed act. By employing such terms, I seek to decisively depict ngayó as a morally 
problematic act. 
Pity and Terror 
Anthropologists rarely deal analytically with the moral implications of  headhunting. By 
examining the anthropological literature on ritual killing and traditional headhunting 
(e.g., Ellen 2002; George 1996; Hoskins 1996) one is left with the impression that such 
practices have little impact on the killers—besides gaining various social privileges. 
Headhunting among the Bugkalot, ngayó, seems to turn this around: the kill did have a 
profound effect on the Bugkalot man, but the successful headhunting raid did not lift 
him above other men in social status. Rather, the common feature that connected the 
various cases of  ngayó was that ngayó, in all cases, became the man’s response to outside 
forces.  
What often surprised me during interviews was that while the stories of  headhunting 
raids depicted a form of  hyper-masculinity, the men who told me about their 
experiences frequently included details that directly went against the image of  
masculinity as the ability to maintain one’s composure and remain unaffected. The men 
would tell me about intimate details that would in other contexts be considered 
shameful. Vomiting from fear, crying in sheer pity. The accounts drew an image of  
expeditions that had involved dread, unease, and indecision. The men appeared to 
oscillate between states of  profound terror—to the point of  throwing up and fainting—
and feelings of  potency and ecstasy. The latter was especially related to the act of  tossing 
the head to the ground with all the force that the cutters, dima memomotog (lit. ‘the ones 
who cut’) could muster. Following this act, the cutter would humiliate the victim verbally, 
hurling insults at the dead body. However, before this act, leading up to the actual kill, 
they described in detail, without having been requested to do so, how some men would 
sometimes ‘freeze’ or, at other times, throw up or even faint. However, the most 
common story had to do with men who went berserk—that is, rather than killing one 
person, they would, for instance, attack a home and kill a whole family in an act of  
uncontrollable violence. Michelle Rosaldo argues, however, that it is not unproblematic 
to approach the emotional life of  Bugkalot headhunters through Western metaphors. 
The headhunter who suddenly finds himself  unable to move in front of  his victim 
would, by the ‘naïve psychologist,’ be described as ‘frozen with fear.’ Having been 
trained as an anthropologist within a particularistic American tradition, she forcefully 
advocates for the virtue of  not applying Western concepts to a local, native context. 
Thus, Rosaldo comments that such a translation of  emotional states between cultures is 
ethnographically invalid—and for this reason, ‘headhunting paralysis stands 
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unexplained’ (M. Rosaldo 1983, 138). I believe, on the other hand, that understanding 
the violent effects of  ngayó requires us to draw lines between widely different 
ethnographic contexts and traditions of  thought. 
For instance, ngayó finds a perhaps odd analogy in the writings of  the 19th century British 
writer, Thomas De Quincey, who identified a transcendental, cathartic capacity in 
murder. In his 1827 essay ‘On Murder Considered as one of  the Fine Arts,’ (2009) De 
Quincey saw the act of  murder as a way of  breaking with the conventional world, which 
made murder similar to a work of  art. However, for murder to be considered art, it had 
to be as useless as art. This point is made in relation to John Williams’s mass-murders of  
two families in Ratcliffe Highway, London, in December 1811. Above all, Williams’s 
violent rampage, according to De Quincey, was purposeless and, apparently, 
inexplicable. For instance, the killer did not know his victims and did not steal anything 
from the households. As the murder could not be tied to motives of  any sort, it brought 
about a perfect transgressive experience on behalf  of  the killer. Murder, De Quincey 
asserted, created an aesthetic suspension from the world through a break with the 
ethical. These aesthetic qualities of  murder lie in its ability to ‘cleanse the heart by the 
means of  pity and terror’ (ibid., 32). The murder that was resolutely carried out 
represented a cathartic experience in the killer, relieving him from repressed sentiments 
and establishing emotional equilibrium. 
Empathizing with the Victim 
De Quincey’s depiction of  the act of  murder seems to have more in common with ngayó 
than the varieties of  headhunting described elsewhere in Southeast Asia. While the 
Rosaldos asserted in all their accounts that the dehumanization of  the victim within the 
context of  ngayó was a fundamental prerequisite for the act to take place in all their 
accounts—as well as in the accounts I have recorded—the dehumanization in fact took 
place after the act. For instance, Renato Rosaldo relates how the headhunters would 
mockingly refer to the dead victim with the same word that denotes the spot where one 
urinates (Rosaldo in Burket, Girard and Smith 1987, 245). However, across the accounts 
that were given by former headhunters it was clear that empathy with the victim shaped 
the experience. As my friend and informant, Tó’paw, explained to me: 
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‘I was around twenty years old at the time that I went with my father and 
the Elders. It was my younger brother who would now cut. We walked for 
many days and we needed only little rice, our feet were light. When we were 
very far away we found a trail. Then we came to a place by the river where 
people came to cross. We then waited until the next evening when a man 
and a woman stopped to rest. They had come to the mountains to fetch 
rattan and they were now on their way down [from the mountains] […] We 
killed the man.’ 
Tó’paw made a motion with his hands as if  he held a spear, indicating that the man had 
been speared to death. He carried on:  
‘My younger brother was the one who cut him. [My brother] then tossed the 
head. That is our custom, as you know. And then the other, the woman, was 
for my uncle. We tied her with the rattan. But before killing the woman, my 
uncle cut off  one of  her legs. I remember how I felt pity, oh, how I pitied 
her. She screamed and so we killed her. My uncle cut and tossed the head.’ 
The subsequent part of  Tó’paw’s story supported the observations made by the 
Rosaldos: as the unruly forces of  ligét had been cast off, Tó’paw explained how he 
gained control over his emotions and his body. Now, being untouched by the people 
around him, he no longer knew anger and shame. But what the Rosaldos do not focus 
on is the pity which headhunters felt towards their victims—their empathetic 
involvement with the victims.   
What De Quincey claimed (and, arguably, the reason his writings appear so 
controversial) was that murder, in his view, offered a ‘sublime effect’ when applied 
decisively. But this required that the human victim must not be denied its status as 
exactly that: a human. In this sense, the form of  killing that he explores deviates from 
headhunting as it is known within the ethnographic literature. It has been a common 
assumption among anthropologists that headhunting and other forms of  trophy taking 
of  human body parts was related to either a problematic ‘humanness’ of  neighbouring 
tribes (Mckinley 1976) or directly linked to dehumanizing practices (Harrison 2006, 
2012). In her treatise on beheadings, the historian Frances Larson points out that the 
‘physical detachment of  a person’s head is often preceded by an assumed social 
detachment that separates the perpetrator from the victim’ (Larson 2014, 270). Larson 
writes that such social detachment may, for instance, be expressed through ideologies of  
racism through which the victims are represented as subhuman. For example, the 
Marind-anim of  Southern New Guinea classified all non-Marind peoples as ‘semi-
human objects of  headhunt’ (Mckinley 1976, 111). The act of  beheading the enemy 
involved removing their humanness. Humanness, Robert Mckinley suggested, posed a 
phenomenological threat within a cosmological system where outsiders were considered 
as non-human. Yet, the inescapable, empirical fact of  the humanness of  the outsider 
kept ‘putting humanness where it should not be.’ Thus, by making sure that a critical 
human component of  the enemy—his head—belonged to one’s own society, the Marind 
maintained ontological order and made sure that things were no longer ‘out of  
place’ (cf. Douglas 1966). It had to do with bringing the inconvenient humanness of  the 
theoretically nonhuman ‘back’ into society where it belongs. By doing so they rescued an 
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entire ideological system from being destroyed by its own inherent contradictions 
(Mckinley 1976, 116-117). Likewise, the Iban of  Borneo used headhunting to 
incorporate their enemies into the village and, thus, into the world of  kinship, fertility, 
and social reproduction. Following a war raid the severed head of  slain enemies were 
treated in a friendly way after they were brought to the village; this involved the offering 
of  food, wine, betel, and tobacco—and keeping the heads warm during cold nights 
(ibid.).  
Simon Harrison (2006) has recently shown that not only have human skulls been used as 
trophies among some indigenous Amazonian, Southeast Asian, and Melanesian 
societies; he argues, that the trophy-taking practices among allied servicemen in the 
Pacific War closely resembled those one might find within traditional headhunting 
societies. The use of  body parts, he argues, may occur in a wide variety of  settings in 
which this type of  imagery of  predation is employed (Harrison 2006, 818). The use of  
trophies is thereby closely tied to the perception of  the enemy as something ‘less-than-
human.’ This was the case in the nineteenth century in southern and eastern Africa, 
where the sport of  trophy hunting was a popular leisure pursuit among colonial officials. 
The British and German soldiers in these areas also beheaded Africans and kept their 
skulls as trophies (Harrison 2006, 819). Evidently such acts of  violence should be 
understood from the perspective of  the racist regime under which they were carried out. 
Similarly, the war in the Pacific was mapped strongly onto social divisions of  race. 
Harrison argues that one of  the conditions that is required to make human trophy-
taking occur within any given society is that the human status of  the enemy is denied to 
begin with; thus, the rendering of  victims into ‘sub-humans’ is a necessary step before 
such violence can be executed.  
The Bugkalot case does not support this notion. Ngayó was not directed at a specific 
category of  people or non-people; besides living up to the criteria of  not being part of  
the assailant’s immediate family, the victims did not belong to a certain category of  
humans. The victims were neither dehumanized nor classified as enemies. The Elders 
who escorted the raids attempted to find victims—men, women, and children alike—to 
whom there was no animosity. Furthermore, I was told that the victims could not belong 
to the ethnic group known as negritos who lived in the northeastern part of  mountains 
and whom many Bugkalots regarded with disdain due to their black skin and nomadic 
living. Rather, what was important was that victims were chosen towards whom the 
headhunter could establish an empathetic relation.  
Rethinking Empathy  
Day after day, listening to men talking about the headhunting raids of  the past made 
these acts stand out as something unreal, as if  listening to fictions. Because of  the 
uncanny ordinariness evoked through such stories, listening to them was—to use one of  
Michael Taussig’s metaphors–‘like watching a sunken world underwater’ (Taussig 1987, 
39). I was gazing at a hazy, anaesthetized past that made me, at first, blind towards 
questions of  morality, transgression, and empathy. For this reason, I opened this paper 
with the words of  Tó’paw, who explained that as time had passed the significance of  
ngayó had changed. For most people today it was just a story; when seen through the 
mists of  history, what was left was only the impression that headhunting was a neatly 
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organized event, which followed the same format since time immemorial and which 
never deviated from a certain ritual structure. In fact, Tó’paw explained to me, this 
missed the entire idea of  ngayó. It never went according to the plan and it was supposed 
to be difficult. The difficult aspect, I have argued, is related to the fundamentally 
transgressive character of  ngayó.  
In an important sense, Tó’paw’s depiction of  how headhunting is conceived among the 
younger generations mirrors how headhunting is portrayed within anthropology. Rather 
than approaching it as a morally ambiguous practice—thus allowing the violence to 
contain the same degree of  complexity as violence in a Western context—it is imagined 
as a uniformly accepted, pristine, traditional practice. First of  all, this reproduces the 
idea that ‘ritual violence’ within indigenous communities around the world ended with 
the introduction Christian morals (Willerslev 2009). Thereby Christianity becomes 
related to a civilizing order and new moral awareness that renders violence problematic 
and transgressive (see also Yang 2011; Harris 1994). I propose, however, that the 
problematic aspects of  ritual killing should not be understood exclusively as a post-
conversion phenomenon. Rather, as Simon Harrison has recently argued, the use of  
parts of  the human body as trophies of  war has been widely practiced also by soldiers in 
modern times. He thereby shows that rather than being an irrational and savage feature 
of  premodern and primitive warfare, there is something about trophy taking—and 
especially the taking of  heads—that transcends the assumed boundaries between 
modern and premodern societies.  
Secondly, this idea of  the pre-Christian moral void renders us unable to properly grasp 
what provided ngayó with its transgressive impetus. Headhunting was, I argue, an act that 
should be grasped in all its moral ambiguity: it gained its impact on the ‘cutter’ due to 
the empathically conditioned relationship that he violated. Thus, headhunting, I suggest, 
does not involve a suspension of  the ethical. It is thereby empathy itself  that contributes 
meaning to violence.  
Empathy is commonly assumed to be a universally shared feature of  the human 
personality that helps to maintain a baseline of  peaceful interaction among humans. By 
putting yourself  in another’s place, even a stranger’s place, you achieve a bodily 
sensation of  the person’s experience in given situation. We empathize with this person. 
And this, we believe, establishes a connection to this person, which involves a pre-
linguistic demand to help and protect. However, this assumption may be challenged 
through ngayó as a violent act that gains its significance from its inherent transgressive 
nature. This article has attempted to approach empathy as both an antithetic detergent 
to violence and, yet, paradoxically motivating violent acts by imbuing such acts with 
transgressive meaning.  Thereby, empathy as a form of  compassion may be linked to 
radical forms of  violence.  
The common feature that connected the various cases of  ngayó was that ngayó, in all 
cases, became the man’s attempt to achieve a heightened a sense of  autonomy. Thus, to 
reach a more comprehensive understanding of  ngayó, we should place the faculty of  
empathy at the centre of  this practice. And rather than simply seeing empathy as the 
detached ability to put oneself  in the other’s stead, empathy should also involve an 
 15
emotional engagement. Therefore, rather than referring to headhunting as ‘ritual 
killing,’ I have deliberately presented ngayó as a specific form of  murder. 
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